SIYĀSAT VA DĪNDĀRĪ ISLĀMĪ: BĀZ-KHĀNĪ ĀRĀʾ VA ANDĪSHA-HĀ-YI MUṢṬAFĀ MALIKIYĀN DARBĀRAH-YI ḤUKŪMAT-I DĪNĪ, SIKŪLĀRĪZM VA RĀBIṬAH-YI ĪN DU. [POLITICS AND RELIGIOSITY IN ISLAM: A RE-EXAMINATION OF MOSTAFA MALEKIAN’S VIEWS ON RELIGIOUS GOVERNANCE, SECULARISM, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP]. By Mohammad Karimiparviz. Qom, Iran: Atrisa. 2015. Pp. 595. Paper. 1,000,000 IRR.
Over the past decades, the discourse on secularism and religious governance has been one of the most significant intellectual and cultural debates in Iran, with numerous articles and books written either in defense or critique of these concepts. Among these works, this study specifically focuses on elucidating and analyzing Mostafa Malekian’s perspective on the relationship between religious governance and secularism.
This work is structured into four chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of Malekian’s life, works, and intellectual foundations. What distinguishes Malekian from other Islamic thinkers is his pursuit of spiritual discussions within the realms of ethics and religion. He argues that rationality and spirituality should not be ends in themselves but should serve humanity by alleviating pain and suffering. One could describe rationality and spirituality as the core of Malekian’s theory, as all his discussions, directly or indirectly, revolve around this project. He believes that in great civilizations, either rationality has been sacrificed for spirituality or vice versa, and that harmonizing the two could resolve many of the issues faced by Eastern and Western civilizations. In his latest reflections on the relationship between religiosity, modernity, spirituality, and rationality, Malekian asserts that religiosity is incompatible with modernity because religiosity is rooted in submission, while modernity is grounded in rationality. However, he argues that spirituality is compatible with rationality, and their relationship is defined by the precedence of rationality, with the spiritual individual reaching faith through rationality. Malekian views spirituality as the ultimate goal of human life, a way of engaging with the world that leads to inner satisfaction, which he defines as resting on three pillars: peace, hope, and joy. He outlines eight characteristics of spirituality, with *authentic living* being the most important, as it entails commitment to oneself and acting based on one’s own understanding. The essence of human authenticity, according to Malekian, is that everything serves humanity, but humanity serves nothing. Everything arises from within; discovering this is the message of all religions and mystical schools. In other words, heaven and hell are nothing but manifestations of one’s own spirit.
Malekian’s intellectual content revolves around existentialist philosophy, reflecting on concepts such as hope, anxiety, peace, and loneliness—concepts closest to the human experience. He identifies two sources of knowledge: reason and revelation, with revelation being reliable only when its propositions are confirmed by reason. He also considers ethics a precursor to religion, meaning that one must first be ethical before becoming religious. Malekian argues that humanity always needs religion, but not in its conventional forms; instead, a new understanding of religion is required, which he equates with spirituality. He contends that if religious governance means imposing religion from above, it is inherently incompatible with democracy. The essence of democracy, he argues, is that the ultimate decision-making power lies with the people. While democracy can coexist with religion, it cannot coexist with religious governance. Malekian believes that in the absence of infallible Imams, a democratic system is the best form of governance human knowledge has achieved, though it is not without flaws.
Malekian views Islamic philosophy as a concept without substance and fundamentally rejects it, emphasizing that opposing Islamic philosophy should not be equated with opposing religion or faith. He argues that when philosophy and Islam are conflated, neither philosophy nor Islamic theology progresses. Philosophy thrives when it does not seek to uphold Islamic sacred texts, and theology grows when it does not seek to preserve ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. Islamic philosophy and theology are independent cultures that can develop separately. Malekian asserts that philosophy should not be committed to any specific religion or sect, and one can be a Muslim without accepting Islamic philosophy. His concern is that labeling a philosophy as “Islamic” fosters a sense of xenophobia or anti-foreign sentiment, preventing the incorporation of useful ideas from other philosophical traditions. He also argues that a rational believer serves others altruistically solely because they are human, not because of shared religion, race, or ethnicity. Malekian proposes an ideal life characterized by three features: happiness, goodness, and meaningfulness. Happiness means deriving the most pleasure and the least pain from life; goodness means living in a way that brings the most happiness and the least pain to others; and meaningfulness involves determining the purpose of life.
The second chapter delves into the study of religion, defining religion and religiosity while addressing the shortcomings in these definitions. Malekian argues that there is no single criterion for religiosity that can encompass all religions and forms of religious practice. He identifies several misunderstandings of religion, including viewing religiosity as the possession of truth, blind submission, a purely logical approach to monotheism, attributing intrinsic value to worship, insincerity, and reducing religion to a single aspect. He further discusses the relationship between rationality and spirituality, as well as the components of practical and theoretical rationality, concluding that rationality is the most important virtue and the most valuable human trait, and that living ethically requires living rationally.
The third chapter explores religion, modernity, and religious reformism. Malekian does not posit an absolute dichotomy between religion and modernity but argues that they are incompatible. He claims that one cannot be fully religious and fully modern simultaneously, though this does not negate the possibility of interaction between the two. He also discusses the relationship between religion and tradition, asserting that the history of a religion begins with the rejection of tradition by its founder, but that for a religion to endure, it must be accepted by successive generations. Malekian identifies three dimensions of religion: 1) the collection of sacred texts, 2) all commentaries and interpretations, and 3) the actions of followers throughout history. He outlines the characteristics of modernity, including new and effective methods of studying nature, new machine technologies, improved material living standards, capitalism and free markets, liberal democracy, and rational inquiry and planning. Malekian argues that if religiosity requires faith, submission, and surrender, then modernity is incompatible with religiosity unless modernity is understood merely as reformism. He also discusses the relationship between modernization, Westernization, and rationalization, asserting that modernization is essentially Westernization. In evaluating modernity in contemporary Iran, Malekian concludes that, culturally, Iranian society in the 21st century cannot be considered modern, though it is modern in terms of civilization, as it utilizes the latest industrial and technological advancements. In discussing religious reformism, Malekian emphasizes the need for intellectuals who are awake while society is sleepwalking, critically engaging with societal norms. He identifies three key roles for intellectuals: logical thinking, liberation from dogma, and freedom from imitation and indoctrination. He argues that a religious reformist’s primary task is to make religion understandable and acceptable to contemporary society, reducing the pain and suffering of people, as religion exists to heal human suffering. This experiential approach to religious teachings arises from the fact that modern individuals cannot simply imitate the traditional, submissive, and historically dependent approach of their predecessors.
The final chapter examines Malekian’s views on democracy, secularism, and religious governance. For Malekian, democracy means a political system where the final say belongs to the people. He outlines eleven conditions necessary for the establishment and maintenance of democracy, arguing that without any one of these, democracy cannot be realized. He defines religious governance as a political system that claims to administer society based on a particular interpretation of religion. While Malekian believes that religion and democracy can coexist, he argues that religious governance and democracy are incompatible. He suggests that a society can be both religious and democratic, but such an interpretation would lead to the secularization of governance. However, he acknowledges one way in which religious governance and democracy could coexist: if the religious governance is based on the will of the people, provided that the people themselves are religious, meaning their demands are religious in nature.
Malekian views religious governance as a system that imposes religion from above and considers it incompatible with democracy. However, some Islamic thinkers, including Imam Khomeini, define religious governance not as the imposition of religion from above but as a system based on divine laws with the participation of the people. In Khomeini’s view, religious governance means that divine laws serve as the framework for governance, but these laws are implemented through democratic institutions and popular participation. Thus, Khomeini does not see religious governance as incompatible with democracy but defines it within a religious framework where the people play an active role. While Malekian advocates for the separation of religion and politics, arguing that religiosity is incompatible with modernity and democracy, Khomeini vehemently opposes this separation, asserting that Islam is a comprehensive religion that encompasses all aspects of human life, including politics. For Khomeini, religion is not only compatible with rationality but also gives meaning to rationality within a religious framework. Therefore, Khomeini sees religious governance not only as compatible with rationality but as the best form of governance for achieving justice and human flourishing. Additionally, while Malekian views Islamic philosophy as a concept without substance and argues that philosophy should be independent of religion, Khomeini values Islamic philosophy and believes it can serve religion. In his view, Islamic philosophy is not only compatible with religion but also aids in the better understanding of religious concepts.
