BARRESĪ FIQHĪ TAKFĪR AZ MANẒAR MADHĀHIB ISLĀMĪ [A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY OF TAKFĪR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAMIC SECTS]. By Zahra Sadat Khalesi-nezhad. Tehran, Iran: Mahvareh. 2022. Pp. 262. Paper. 850,000 IRR.
In contemporary times, the most significant challenge facing the unity of the Islamic Ummah is the phenomenon of ” Takfīr.” The world we inhabit has transformed into a singular community, where fostering unity and transcending differences should be the objective of any monotheistic society concerned with the well-being of divine religions, including Islam and their followers.
Amidst this backdrop, numerous works have been produced; however, this study differentiates between the existing Takfiri movements within both Shia and Sunni Islam.
The work is structured into three main sections, each addressing crucial topics across distinct chapters.
In the first section, the general principles are introduced. The first chapter of this section explores the conceptual definitions of key terms and terminologies. In linguistic terms, “Kufr” refers to concealing something, and is sometimes equated with the darkness of night, which obscures visibility. In the terminology of Shia jurists, “Kufr” denotes a lack of faith in something and stands in opposition to Islam. However, the definition of Kufr varies according to scriptural verses and can be categorized into two types: the first type involves a person who obstinately denies the truth, rendering them a Kāfir, while in other circumstances, this label may not apply. The second type, known as practical Kufr, refers to the ingratitude for blessings. In the context of Islamic jurisprudence, Kufr embodies the denial of God’s oneness, the prophethood of Muhammad, or the Shari‘a of Islam.
Additionally, the author examines the linguistic and terminological meanings of “Imān,” which connotes assurance, peace, and affirmation. In the Quran, faith is not merely a matter of belief but entails submission, as many may hold beliefs yet fail to submit to them. A true believer is one who surrenders to the truth, an assertion that inherently involves action. The author continues to delineate the distinctions between Imān and Islam, explaining that while Islam is associated with outward expressions of faith, true Islam involves heartfelt acceptance, which constitutes authentic faith. In the Quran, Islam is positioned against polytheism, while faith stands in opposition to Kufr, as true faith represents an internal acknowledgment of truth, whereas Kufr amounts to concealing it.
The author further analyzes the views of jurists and legal scholars regarding faith, presenting a multitude of definitions. Among the manifestations of Kufr is apostasy. In linguistic terms, apostasy signifies a return or regression, while in religious terminology, it refers to a renouncement of Islam in favor of disbelief. Other manifestations of Kufr include polytheism, where an individual relinquishes belief in God’s oneness. Related traits include “Fisq,” defined as a departure from righteousness and obedience, or the deliberate commission of major sins, and “Bid‘a,” which refers to innovations within the religion without any prior precedent that contradicts the tradition of the Prophet and the commandments of God.
Moreover, “Nifāq,” or hypocrisy, describes individuals whose outward manifestations of faith starkly contrast with their inner disbelief. Another form of Kufr is “Ilḥād,” defined as an aberration from the truth that obliterates faith. The work also discusses the concept of “opposition,” which can culminate in apostasy and the abandonment of faith. A further aspect of Kufr involves the denial of religious necessities, defined as rulings that are self-evident within the religion — a denial that can pertain to fundamental tenets like Tawhid and Nubuwa, as well as essential practices such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage.
The author subsequently scrutinizes the term “Takfīr,” defined as attributing disbelief to another individual. Verses and hadiths caution against branding others as Kafīr, particularly those who have professed Islam. The majority of Islamic jurists and theologians assert that one cannot declare Takfīr on any individual who orients towards the Qibla, accepts the oneness of God, acknowledges the Prophethood of Muhammad, and does not deny essential religious doctrines. The author elucidates the perspectives of Shia and Sunni scholars regarding the definition of Takfīr.
In the second chapter of this section, the historical background of Takfīr is analyzed through four subsections: 1. Ancient Civilizations 2. Pre-Islamic Contexts (Other Religions) 3. Post-Islamic Contexts 4. Legal Systems and Schools of Thought. Takfīr practices in ancient civilizations, including Greece, wherein individuals like the Sophists were declared Kāfir by representatives in city assemblies and removed from legal protections, are explored. The concept of apostasy is not exclusive to Islam; it has pre-Islamic antecedents in various other religions, accompanied by distinct punitive measures, some of which have evolved over time. The Islamic historical record reflects that during the early Islamic period, particularly during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, opposing factions were often labeled as Kāfir. Additionally, various ;legal systems have witnessed instances of Takfir, such as the excommunication of Gregory VII from the Polish King and the excommunication of Henry V.
The author continues in the second section with a theoretical foundation concerning the concept of . Takfīr. The first chapter discusses the theological underpinnings of Takfir, positing that according to Quranic teachings, only in two instances is the “deprivation of another’s right to life” justified — in other words, the unlawful killing of an innocent person and “disturbing social security,” termed as creating corruption in society. The Quran indicates that killing an innocent individual is tantamount to slaying all of humanity; conversely, preserving one life is akin to saving all humanity. Consequently, human life holds tremendous value in Islam, and the act of murder or Takfir against an individual is not something to be taken lightly.
The second chapter outlines the legal foundations of Takfīr. According to Islamic legal scholars, Kufr consists of renouncing God’s divinity and oneness, the Prophethood of Muhammad, Islamic law, and necessary religious beliefs. Although there are distinctions between Shia and Sunni interpretations regarding the punishment for apostasy, those who experience doubt or hesitation in their beliefs are typically not considered apostate.
In the third section, the author conducts a comparative examination of the jurisprudential tenets surrounding Takfīr. The first chapter delineates the jurisprudential grounds and conditions for declaring Takfīr. Quranic and hadith teachings clearly caution Muslims against labeling others as Kāfir without just cause; indeed, some narrations portray the Takfīr -maker as Kāfir themselves. Nevertheless, unfortunately, extremist groups frequently engage in Takfīr for trivial reasons. The causes of Takfīr are manifold, including ignorance, religious extremism, unwarranted suspicion, misguided biases, and the ambitions aimed at eroding the unity of Islamic societies. However, Takfīr itself has specific criteria: due diligence and certainty regarding an individual’s Kufr, awareness of the underlying factors contributing to their disbelief, and an intention and purpose in the individual’s actions. Takfīr represents a legal ruling that must be divinely sanctioned, hence declaring Takfīr based solely on suspicion or conjecture is impermissible, as emphasized by both Shia and Sunni traditions.
Crucially, the Quranic definition of a believer does not solely pertain to Muslims, Shia or Sunni, but encompasses the People of the Book, as anyone who believes in God and the Day of Judgment and performs righteous deeds will attain salvation. Thus, one cannot declare Takfīr against individuals solely based on the possession of a differing faith, as sectarian differences do not disqualify an individual from justice and truth. It must be emphasized that an individual may adhere to the path of righteousness without attaining truth, rendering them excusable and not deserving of a label of Kufr.
A brief historical overview of Muslims starkly reveals that many accusations and acts of Takfīr have emerged from personal vendettas and biased agendas, often fostered within contexts of ignorance. An illustrative example is the excommunication of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, regarded as the first Muslim after Muhammad and a close companion, who faced Takfīr from Mu‘āwīya and the Khāwarij, leading to his assassination. Similar trends continued against other Imams, such as Imam Husain, who likewise was labeled an apostate, justifying bloodshed against him. Such extremist and stringent views towards Shia communities have persisted throughout history, largely due to a lack of understanding of their beliefs. Among those who have espoused stringent Takfīr doctrines is Ibn Taymīya, known for declaring numerous individuals and groups as Kāfir. His ideas have gained traction among extremists seeking to justify their actions, despite criticism from mainstream Sunni scholars. Mohammed ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb is another figure associated with Takfiri thoughts, leading to the Takfīr of various other religions and sects. The author then compares the ideologies of the Khawārij and Wahhabism.
Ultimately, Takfīr is not a novel phenomenon within Islam; rather, it is a historical occurrence fueled by social and intellectual dynamics. The essence of Takfīr remains consistent with historical precedents. Nevertheless, contemporary manifestations of Takfīr are distinguishable from those of the past due to four primary characteristics: 1. Its global dimensions 2. The networked nature of Takfiri groups 3. Engagement in unprecedented and brutal acts of violence 4. The tarnishing of Islam’s compassionate image in the eyes of the world.
In the second chapter of this section, the author proposes solutions to combat Takfīr through the education of society by religious scholars, self-discipline, the establishment of scholarly movements among Islamic scholars to delineate the boundaries between Islam and Kufr clearly, and ultimately fostering mutual understanding.
Although the author primarily addresses the Takfīr phenomenon among Muslims, it should be noted that such beliefs are also mirrored by Takfiris towards other Abrahamic faiths. Contextually, this aspect of the subject matter could warrant further exploration. Ultimately, according to the verses of the Quran, if all followers of the Abrahamic faiths adopt a perspective of unity and engage in dialogue, the scale of such disagreements will diminish. If we strive for this unity, we will embody the essence of monotheism; conversely, if we pursue division and emphasize our differences, we must call into question our own adherence to Tawhid. It bears mentioning that the Quranic discourse on disbelievers does not unconditionally apply to non-Muslims; rather, the prominent Shia commentator, ‘Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’i, interprets disbelievers as those who harbor animosity towards the truth and evade acceptance thereof. Consequently, it is noted in the Quran that God identifies certain People of the Book as believers, notwithstanding their non-Islamic faith. Furthermore, according to ‘Allāmeh Moṭahhari, many priests may find their place in paradise, indicating that one cannot simply attribute Kufr based on a person’s non-Muslim status.
Hossein Baqeri
Tolou International Institute, Qom, Iran
